



MONITORING AND REPORTING THE
SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT






Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Defensive Publications
Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.
Recommended Citation
Johnston, Jay; White, David; Rezk, Abdelmoniem; and Mortensen, Magnus, "MONITORING AND REPORTING THE SAFETY
PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT MODELS AND VERSIONS OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES", Technical Disclosure
Commons, (September 30, 2019)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/2532
 1 5873X 
MONITORING AND REPORTING THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT 
MODELS AND VERSIONS OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
 








 Presented herein are techniques that enable an administrative authority (e.g., city, 
municipality, etc.) to determine when a vehicle is under autonomous control, as well as to 
specifically determine the vendor and software version of the autonomous control system 
controlling the vehicle. If the vehicle has problems navigating the environment, the details 
of that problem are reported directly to the administrative authority. Any trending problems 
detected after a software update to the control systems can be proactively detected and 
reported to the vehicle vendor and upstream aggregation systems. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
It is expected that, in the future, there will be hundreds of thousands of autonomous 
vehicles (AVs) roaming the streets of our cities, potentially with inconsistent capabilities. 
That is, the AVs will be made by different companies, using different technical approaches 
(different sensors, ML techniques, etc.), and have different functions, safety features, etc. 
(i.e., some AVs will be safer than others) and many AV systems will have bugs. 
 
Administrative authorities face a number of challenges with AVs, including: 
 AV systems will be constantly changing via over-the-air software updates that may 
make the AVs safer.  However, updates may cause new problems (a regression) 
that, in fact, make the AVs less safe.  As such, administrative authorities cannot 
assume that all versions of AV software for a vendor going forward will be safer 
than the last version and over-the-air updates may cause the safety levels to change 
over time with each new update. 
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 Administrative authorities are different and different AV models and versions will 
work better or worse in different areas/cities. For example, different cities have 
specific roads and features (e.g., lane markings, street lights, potholes, etc.) that are 
unique to their city, and those features will trigger negative edge cases in the neural-
net processing of different AV models and versions. 
 
For example shown in FIGs. 1A and 1B, below, are street grids for Boston and for Salt 





FIG. 1A      FIG. 1B 
 
As can be seen, the streets shown in FIGs. 1A and 1B are very different and an AV 
system that has been proven to work great in Salt Lake City may not operate properly in 
Boston (i.e., cannot blindly trust AVs to work as well in all locations).  Moreover, a first 
software version (e.g., AV version A) might work well for Boston, but a subsequent version 
(e.g., AV version B) may introduce a regression causing it to have problems with sharp left 
turns, causing the corresponding AV to suddenly become unsafe in Boston.  For example, 
an update to a neural network control system might cause a regression that is triggered by 
a specific feature of a specific city (a specific winding road for example).   
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In conventional systems, users are reporting that new regressions are introduced 
when companies push out AV system updates over-the-air.  These regressions have greater 
impacts in certain areas than in other areas.   
Administrative authorities want to control of how AVs operate in their area.  
However, with a flood of new vendors offering AVs, administrative authorities have no 
way to measure the safety of the many different types of AVs that operate in their 
jurisdictions.  The administrative authorities have no way to distinguish which AV types 
are safer than others, nor do they have the tools needed to know which vehicles are in 
autonomous mode.  As such, a technical solution is needed that provides administrative 
authorities with the tools needed to determine the safety capabilities of the AVs operating 
in their jurisdictions, as well as the tools needed to determine which specific AV software 
versions and models are safer than others.  While hardware components and 
communication stacks can conform to hardware and communication standards, software 
implementations can vary between manufacturers. While there is no means to control that 
implementation, administrative authorities need the ability to assess the safety and 
performance of AVs and, as needed, invoke actions to both hardware and software AV 
implementations.  
Adding to the potential of full Autounomosity of a vehicle, it has been proposed to 
maintain full communication between AVs and the administrative authority infrastructure 
so as to exchange relevant information that could benefit the other entity.  This is defined 
as Vehicle to Anything (V2X), which incorporates a more specific type of communications 
such as the Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and the Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) 
communications.  The main motivations toward having V2X communications are road 
safety, traffic efficiency, and energy savings. There are two types of V2X communication 
technology depending on the underlying technology being used: 
 Wireless LAN - based technology: Based on IEEE 802.11p and IEEE 1609 serve 
as the underlying technology for Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) 
that is defined under ITS-G5 by the EU.  
 Cellular-based technology (C-V2X): 3GPP standard-based describing the V2X 
Standard started from Release 14 and recently expanded in Release 15 and to be 
enhanced in Release 16. It is also known LTE-V2X (4G version) and recently 5G-
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V2X in release 15 (promoted by 5G Automotive Association). C-V2X enables the 
communications with the wider network in addition to V2V, V2I, unlike IEEE 
802.11p in which defines V2V and V2I communications only. 
 
While both IEEE 802.11p/1609 and 3GPP defines the data transport features that 
enable V2X, it does not include V2X semantic content but proposes the usage of Dedicated 
Short-Range Communications (DSRC) defined under ITS-G5 standards.  The DSRC 
utilize J2735 messages format, the structure of messages, data frames, and data elements 
defined by SAE application for V2V communication and V2V communication (with units 
called Roadside Units). Some of these messages are:  
 BasicSafetyMessage (BSM): For V2V safety message and it is broadcasted by 
vehicles to provide situational data (location, heading, speed, etc.) to surrounding 
vehicles, used to assess threat potentials 
 SPaT/Map: Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) and it is broadcasted by Roadside 
Units (RSU) to provide the current signal status (color) by lane and when the status 
is expected to change. MAP: It is broadcast by RSUs to provide a geometric layout 
of an intersection and used in conjunction with SPaT 
 PersonalSafetyMessage (PSM): It is broadcasted by Vulnerable Road User (VRU) 
devices (onboard of Pedestrians, Bicycles, Roadworks, etc.) to announce their 
presence to approaching vehicles. 
 Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAM) and Decentralized Environmental 
NotificationMessage (DENM). CAMs are a kind of heartbeat messages 
periodically broadcasted by each vehicle to its neighbors to provide information of 
presence, position, temperature, and basic status. On the contrary, DENMs are 
event-triggered messages broadcasted to alert Road Side Units and hence Road 
users of a hazardous event 
 TestMessages: Define testing messages  
 
 The message structure in this stack define applications to improve roadway safety 
and efficient operation.  However, this can get complicated without applying governance 
on the underlying software implementations, version variations for different models (and 
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for the same model, and potential abnormal behavior against standard road structure or 
expected and unexpected situation. 
 The techniques presented herein propose to utilize the current V2X communication 
stack and extend it to provide administrative authority the tools to assess and govern the 
behavior of an AV and, potentially, invoke an action to it (i.e., define a measurement 
messaging between the Vehicle in Autonomous mode and the administrative authority 
infrastructure for data-driven assessment). 
 The techniques presented herein enable administrative authorities to collect and 
aggregate safety information about the AVs that operate within their jurisdictions/domains. 
Rather than waiting for citizens and police to report problems with AVs (and specific 
versions of AV control systems from a vendor), the techniques presented herein enable the 
relevant administrative authority to be proactive in determining which AV control systems 
might have safety problems within the roads in their jurisdictions. The information can be 
further up-leveled to a hosted cloud service for more analytics and aggregation.  As self-
driving vehicles begin to transform the way people get around, city and municipal planners 
around the world are beginning to think about how the AVs will affect their areas, while 
changing the way humans live and interact with vehicles.   
 In general, the techniques presented are described with reference to an Autonomous 
Vehicle level 5 driving mode as defined by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). 
An Autonomous Vehicle (AV), by this definition, excludes a motor vehicle enabled with 
active safety systems or driver- assistance systems.  Instead, an Autonomous Vehicle mode 
in this context is capable of sensing its environment and moving with no human 
intervention or input. An Autonomous Vehicle combines the outputs from a variety of 
sensors to perceive their surroundings (e.g., Radar, LIDAR, SONAR, GPS, Odometry, 
Inertial Measurement Units, etc.), all controlled by an on-board control system that 
interprets sensory information and identifies navigation paths, obstacles, and relevant 
traffic signage.  
 The techniques presented herein are explained in the context of several primary 
operations, namely: 
1. Vehicles report autonomous control state advertisements to the administrative 
authority infrastructure. 
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2. Vehicles report problems observed with navigating the area. 
3. The infrastructure uses its own sensors to monitor the performance of AVs in its 
area and records any deviations. 
4. The administrative authority evaluates the aggregate performance of the different 
AV system versions and reports problems to a cloud aggregator service. 
Each of these operations is described in greater detail below. 
 
Vehicles Report Autonomous Control State Advertisements to the Infrastructure 
AVs operating within the jurisdiction of an administrative authority use the 
Vehicle to Infrastructure to advertise when they have initiated autonomous control, as 
well as details about the autonomous control system.  The AVs also use the Vehicle to 
Infrastructure to advertise when they disengage from autonomous control. This allows the 
infrastructure to understand details of the system guiding the vehicle, as well as what 
AVs are operating autonomously.   






"vendor": " Autodrive ", 
"model": "2018 – CAR Type Z", 
"vendor_autonomy_system": "Autodrive - Full Autonomy", 
"vendor_autonomy_version": "12.3.2.12", 
"vendor_autonomy_version_release_date" : 1554227981, 
"vendor_autonomy_previous_version": "12.3.2.11", 




It is noted that not only are the vendor and the autonomy level reported, but the 
version and model of the autonomy system are also reported.  This information is key to 
the administrative authority understanding what edge cases might exist in the neural 
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networks running on the different versions of the control systems.  It is to be appreciated 
that the techniques presented herein also extends to reporting additional details of the 
autonomous capabilities, such as the specific hardware versions and capabilities, sight 
and sensor distance, etc. 
In operation, the AV data is transmitted as a beacon that announces key facts 
about the state of the autonomous system. The data is leveraged by the administrative 
authority using a connected city platform to derive insights, as explained further below. 
 
Vehicles Report Problems Observed with Navigating the Area 
The AVs may also advertise any problems they encounter with navigation and 
driving in the area (e.g., jurisdiction) of the administrative authority.  These advertisements 
may occur at any time, such as when the AV is unable to navigate safely with confidence.  
 
Example - Reporting problems caused by poor lane markings: 
As shown in FIG. 2, below, an AV may be unable to distinguish the lane markings 
in a certain area.  Therefore, the AV may, for example, report this inability to the city so 
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An example data structure of the autonomous vehicle reporting a problem with 




"incident_location": "32??16'12.9"N+81??18'47.1"W @ 213deg @ 40mph", 
"device_UUID": "72150660-8343-42c0-98dd-d78fa7ac4022", 
"incident_type": "Unrecognized lane markings", 
"record_data": "http://connected_platform.cisco.com/kinetic/evidence/72150660-8343-
42c0-98dd-d78fa7ac4022/12312.png", 
"vendor_autonomy_system": " Autodrive - Full Autonomy", 
"vendor_autonomy_version": "12.3.2.12", 
"vendor_autonomy_version_release_date" : 1554227981, 
"vendor_autonomy_previous_version": "12.3.2.11", 
} 
 In certain circumstances, the reports might be triggered by true positives, where 
the vehicle has detected a legitimate problem with the environment and, by reporting it to 
the administrative authority, the problem might be corrected by the administrative 
authority sooner (than if it is not reported). For example, if a number of vehicles report 
lane-line reading problems to the administrative authority, it can dispatch workers to 
improve those lines. 
In other circumstances, the reports might be false positives that are not caused by 
a problem with the roads.  In such cases, the specific autonomous control system has a 
problem understanding a legitimate environment and this problem needs to be solved by 
the vendor. 
Example - Reporting problems caused by local weather conditions: 
If poor weather is contributing to the situational awareness for the vehicle, then 
that can be reported as well. For example, if certain streets in San Francisco are reported 
to be very foggy (with reduced visibility) between 6-8 AM each day, then this can be 
aggregated by the administrative authority to let it predictively alert other vehicles that 
there might be a problem during that time.  An example data structure of such an example 
is: 
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"incident_location": "32??16'12.9"N+81??18'47.1"W @ 213deg @ 40mph", 
"device_UUID": "72150660-8343-42c0-98dd-d78fa7ac4022", 





"vendor_autonomy_system": " Autodrive - Full Autonomy", 
"vendor_autonomy_version": "12.3.2.12", 
"vendor_autonomy_version_release_date" : 1554227981, 
"vendor_autonomy_previous_version": "12.3.2.11", 
} 
Example - Reporting potential Future problems: 
The system can also be used to report where there might be a problem in the 
future.  For example, if an AV is able to recognize a stop sign that is partially covered by 
foliage, then that problem has a potential to grow worse.  It is beneficial to the AV 
reports this information to the administrative authority.  FIG. 3, below, illustrates stop 
signs detected by an AV, where two stop signs are partially obscured. 
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"incident_location": "32??16'12.9"N+81??18'47.1"W @ 213deg @ 40mph", 
"device_UUID": "72150660-8343-42c0-98dd-d78fa7ac4022", 
"incident_type": "Poor visibility of navigation instruction sign (stop sign)", 
"type": "stop_sign", 
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"vendor_autonomy_system": " Autodrive - Full Autonomy", 
"vendor_autonomy_version": "12.3.2.12", 




The Infrastructure uses its own Sensors to Monitor the Performance of AVs in its 
Area and Records any Deviations 
In some cases, the AVs will not know that they have a problem and they will 
encounter a false negative since they do not detect their own problem. Therefore, it is 
important that the administrative authority leverages its own infrastructure to monitor the 
performance of the AVs from its own perspective (its own traffic cameras, for example) 
and detect, save, aggregate and report any problems that it sees. An example of such 
monitoring is shown in FIG. 4, below. 
 
FIG. 4 
Due to the use of the AV beacon advertisement, the infrastructure can correlate the 
vehicle that advertised its beacon with the vehicle that it observes having a problem.  
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The Administrative Authority Evaluates the Aggregate Performance of the 
Different AV system Versions and Reports Problems to a Cloud Aggregator Service 
The connected vehicle infrastructure platform now has the systems in place to 
measure the safety problems of the AVs in its area.  The connected vehicle infrastructure 
platform can also calculate the overall safety levels of not just the different AV vendors, 
but also the specific autonomous control system versions for each vendor.  As such, the 
administrative authority can now determine when a new AV control system update is 
having trouble navigating the environment or experiencing some other safety problem. 
Cloud Aggregator Service 
The above description has focused on the individual city-centric solution, where 
each administrative authority runs their own unique instance of the solution on-prem. 
However, a hybrid solution may include sending the data to a cloud service for additional 
analysis.  In such examples, the cloud service can be a trusted source of AV data for 
administrative authorities that are looking to unlock their cities to AVs, but in a safe, smart 
way.  For example, if a new version of Autodrive is deployed, the vehicles that pick up that 
new version will announce that change in their autonomous control state advertisements. 
Any significant problems with certain versions of AV control systems are sent to a cloud 
aggregator service, which then does more processing on the problems reported by other 
administrative authorities.  Such examples may provide a better view of how different AV 
control system versions are working across the country. 
 
Administrative Authority using a "Trusted" AV vendor to Audit their Environment 
Prior to Allowing all AVs 
One question that may arise is how an administrative authority cane be confident 
that their driving environment is safe for most AVs before they allow AVs in their areas?  
In another use case of the techniques presented herein, before allowing all AVs to navigate 
the area, an administrative authority could allow only a highly-rated AV system to navigate 
their environment and report back any problems that are detected (e.g., bad lane-lines, 
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ambiguous signs, etc.) with their streets.  For example, the cloud aggregator service could 
determine that the roads of Raleigh, North Carolina are very similar to Topeka, Kansas, 
and that Autodrive Version 3.221.12 works very well in Topeka.  As such, the cloud 
aggregator service could indicate that Raleigh should allow vehicles of that specific version 
of Autodrive to operate in its environment to detect and report any problems with the 
infrastructure. 
In summary, the techniques presented herein propose the use of a vehicle 
advertisement to the administrative authority (e.g., city, municipality, etc.) infrastructure.  
This vehicle advertisement may indicate, for example, that the AV is operating 
autonomously, the autonomy level, software version (neural net version) running, and/or 
other details.  Additionally, the AVs report to the infrastructure when they detect problems 
due to the driving environment (which might help explain why it had trouble driving).  AVs 
may report, for example, if they can recognize an important object (like a stop sign), but 
the recognition confidence is low or might become lower (due to obstruction by a tree for 
example).  Moreover, the infrastructure uses its own sensors to monitor the performance 
of the AVs and records any deviations from acceptable driving behavior.  The 
infrastructure may determine if certain versions/vendors of AVs have problems with 
specific roads, or time of day, etc.  The infrastructure may also determine if there are certain 
specific roads or areas that could cause problems for AVs that need to be resolved before 
they allow all AVs to travel autonomously.  In certain examples, the infrastructure reports 
observations to a central authority for sharing and aggregation with other organizations. 
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